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Substantive Economic Due Process and Equal
Protection in Pennsylvania: Are We Free from
Restrictive Economic Regulation?
INTRODUCTION
A potential client walks into your office with the following prob-
lem: he is the proprietor of a small business in a community where
trash collection is provided to its residents by a local government
agency, with a corresponding fee charged for the service. The trash
collection offered by the township is inadequate and the proprietor
has contracted with a private hauler to collect the trash. Over the
past four-and-one-half years your client has paid over $51,000 in
refuse removal fees to the township for a service not utilized, and
during the same time period, the private hauler who has actually
removed the trash charged less than $23,000. Your client wants his
township trash collection fee refunded as well as the fee waived in
the future.
Your client feels that the township trash collection fees are un-
reasonable and an unjust taking. You face the problem of trying to
have the township ordinance declared unconstitutional.
This comment concentrates on the treatment of individual eco-
nomic rights and their abridgement by state legislation. Legisla-
tures have been enacting economic regulatory statutes for many
years. This comment concerns itself with the treatment federal and
state courts have given these statutes in the past as well as their
status today in light of a challenge to their constitutionality.
As this comment will illustrate, the level of protection afforded
economic rights in the federal system has changed over the last 120
years. Protection has gone from very limited to extremely power-
ful, and now has returned to very limited. This comment will also
show that over the years, the test for analyzing economic constitu-
tional protection has never changed; however, the courts have
looked at the components of the test in different ways.
This comment will also illustrate that the general rule for ana-
lyzing individual economic rights in Pennsylvania is the same as in
the federal courts, resulting in very little protection. The comment
will then show a line of Pennsylvania cases which seem to ignore
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the general rule and invalidate economic regulatory statutes in
favor of individual economic rights.
DUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE FEDERAL AND PENNSYLVANIA
CONSTITUTIONS
In the United States, all people enjoy the legal protection of two
constitutions, the United States Constitution and the constitution
of the state in which they reside. This comment will show that the
protection afforded under a state constitution may be greater than
the protection afforded by the United States Constitution.
The protection of economic rights under the United States Con-
stitution is properly analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees every person due process
and the equal protection of the law.' The Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion does not have any specific reference to due process or equal
protection but is also construed to guarantee this same protection. 2
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.3
The section of the Pennsylvania Constitution which has been con-
strued as the Due Process and Equal Protection Clause states:
Section 32. The General Assembly shall pass no local or special law in any
case which has been or can be provided for by general law and specifically
the General Assembly shall not pass any local or special law:
1. Regulating the affairs of counties, cities, townships, wards, boroughs or
school districts;
2. Vacating roads, town plats, streets or alleys;
3. Locating or changing county seats, erecting new counties or changing
county lines;
4. Erecting new townships or boroughs, changing township lines, borough
limits or school districts;
5. Remitting fines, penalties and forfeitures, or refunding moneys legally
paid into the treasury;
6. Exempting property from taxation;
7. Regulating labor, trade, mining or manufacturing;
8. Creating corporations, or amending, renewing or extending the charters
thereof;
1. US Const, Amend XIV.
2. Kroger v O'Hara Township, 481 Pa 101, 392 A2d 266, 273 (1978).
3. US Const, Amend XIV.
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Nor shall the General Assembly indirectly enact any special or local law
by the partial repeal of a general law; but laws repealing local or special acts
may be passed.
4
It is clear from reading the two constitutions that the wording is
not the same.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized Article III, Section
32 as the Equal Protection Clause of the state constitution many
times. In Kroger v O'Hara Township,5 Justice Manderino stated,
In the past we have stated that the content of this provision is not signifi-
cantly different from the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitu-
tion . . . [but] the language of the Pennsylvania Constitution is substan-
tially different from the federal constitution. We are not free to treat that
language as though it was not there.0
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has never analyzed how the dif-
ference in language between the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and Article III, Section 32 of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution affects the rights that emanate from them.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has most often been willing to
state that Article III, Section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution
is the equivalent of equal protection in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.7 It does seem that the opportunity is available for the Penn-
sylvania courts to use the difference in language as a means to ex-
pand the rights protected under the Pennsylvania Constitution. In
Kroger, Justice Manderino at least acknowledged that the differ-
ence exists and that it may allow the Pennsylvania courts to use
independent state analysis instead of automatically following fed-
eral analysis."
The questions are, how different are the two clauses in effect,
and in what areas does this difference manifest itself? This com-
ment will show one area where the difference may be evident, the
development of the protection of individual economic rights.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
is the area where federal law classifies its protection of economic
interests. The Fourteenth Amendment's history will be traced
4. Pa Const, Art III, § 32.
5. 481 Pa 101, 392 A2d 266 (1978).
6. Kroger, 392 A2d at 274 (emphasis in original). In Kroger, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court ruled that the Pennsylvania statutory Sunday sales ban was unconstitutional
as violative of the Pennsylvania Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. Id. For a more de-
tailed discussion of Kroger, see notes 87-94 and accompanying text.




from its early protection which was narrowly construed to protect
only the rights of newly freed slaves, to due process's high water
mark, protection of everyone's economic right to contract. Further
historical analysis will show how Fourteenth Amendment protec-
tion gradually backed away from strong economic protection to
settle on a test which offers very little protection of economic
rights. This comment will then explore the state of the law in
Pennsylvania, setting forth the general rule for equal protection
analysis for economic rights. Then it will examine some isolated
Pennsylvania cases that were decided during the time frame in
which the federal trend was toward less economic protection.
These cases will serve to illustrate that Pennsylvania has at times
independently decided the level of protection afforded to economic
rights.
This comment will conclude that in the analysis of freedom from
restrictive economic regulation, the Pennsylvania standard is at
times more strict than the federal standard. However, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court has not been consistent in their interpreta-
tion or applicability of their standard, so the outcome is
unpredictable.
FEDERAL TREND IN PROTECTION FROM ECONOMIc REGULATION
The protection of individual economic rights evolved under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This
section of the comment illustrates the protection made available
by the Fourteenth Amendment. This comment will show that the
initial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment limited its ap-
plication to a very narrow group of people. Later equal protection
cases expanded the availability of Fourteenth Amendment protec-
tion to most people.
Economic rights were not given any constitutional protection un-
til around 1905. This initial economic protection was afforded by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 The ra-
tional basis test 10 evolved and became the standard for analyzing
the protection an individual would receive for his economic rights
in the face of a burdensome economic statute.
9. The text of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution may
be found at note 3 and accompanying text.
10. The rational basis test provides that a court will not overturn a statute if it has a




Due process was a strong protector of individual economic liber-
ties for close to thirty years. During the years after the start of the
great depression, however, the mood of the United States Supreme
Court seemed to change. The Court no longer afforded uncondi-
tional due process protection to the economic liberty of contract.
The Court was using the same rational relationship test, but now
was able to accept some state interests as legitimate for the first
time. The rational relationship test still required a reasonable rela-
tionship between an economic regulation and a legitimate state in-
terest, but the Court suddenly found more legitimacy in state
interests.
Further analyis shows that the United States Supreme Court
continues to use the rational relationship test to review the
abridgement of economic liberties by state legislation. The test
continues to require a rational relationship between a state regula-
tion and a legitimate state interest, but the recent cases stand for
the proposition that the Court will not require the state to have
previously considered what the state interest is. The Court will
provide a state interest where one is needed.
The first line of cases to interpret the protection offered by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution were
the Slaughter House Cases." This line of cases involved a chal-
lenge to a Louisiana statute which prohibited the operation of
slaughter houses within certain areas of New Orleans, except by
the state-created monopoly. 2 The Court recognized that this was
the first opportunity to interpret the protection given by the Four-
teenth Amendment.'3 The powerful protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, and the Due Process Clause were emasculated by
Justice Miller when the Court found that the purpose of the Four-
teenth Amendment was to protect only the newly freed slaves.
14
This view of the Fourteenth Amendment by the Court effec-
tively limited its successful application to cases where racial dis-
crimination was present, as the cases of Strauder v West Vir-
ginia"5 and Yick Wo v Hopkins" illustrate. Strauder was a case in
11. 83 US 36 (1873).
12. Slaughter House Cases, 83 US at 59.
13. Id at 67.
14. Id at 81. "The existence of laws in the States where the newly emancipated ne-
groes resided, which discriminated with gross injustice and hardship against them as a class,
was the evil to be remedied by this clause, and by it such laws are forbidden." Id.
15. 100 US 303 (1880).
16. 118 US 356 (1886).
1992
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which due process analysis was successfully used to create individ-
ual liberties. In this case a black man was convicted of murder by a
jury which could not contain any black members because of local
jury selection rules. 17 The Due Process Clause was successfully
used to reverse the conviction because the defendant was not con-
victed by a jury of his peers.18 The Court reasoned that since
blacks were excluded form jury service, the defendant was denied
the equal protection of the laws. 19
Another early case in which the Fourteenth Amendment was
successfully used to prevent racial discrimination was Yick Wo v
Hopkins. Yick Wo was convicted of violating a San Francisco ordi-
nance regulating the laundry business in the city.20 The Court, us-
ing the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
decided the conviction could not stand because the ordinance was
being enforced in a manner which discriminated against the Chi-
nese. Thus in this case, the Equal Protection Clause was expanded
to protect the liberties of minority races in addition to the newly
freed slaves.2 '
The rise to power of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in economic protection came with the Court's decision
in Lochner v New York.2, In this case the United States Supreme
Court reviewed a New York statute which sought to regulate the
number of hours a bakery employee could work. 3 Justice Peckham
held the statute invalid as an improper exercise of the police power
of the state.24 The Court held that the individual's right of con-
tract was superior to the state's police power to regulate employ-
ment.25 Under due process analysis, an individual's right to the
contract of his choice was a liberty interest which was protected by
the United States Constitution.26 The Court invalidated the stat-
17. Strauder, 118 US at 304. Jury service was limited to white male persons over
twenty-one years old. Id at 305.
18. Id at 312.
19. Id at 308-09.
20. Yick Wo, 118 US at 359. The ordinance prohibited the operation of a laundry in a
wooden building without a special license. Id at 358.
21. Id at 374. The Court found that the law was fair on its face, but was enforced
with an unequal hand. Id.
22. 198 US 45 (1905).
23. Lochner, 198 US at 52. The New York statute limited the employment of an
employee to a maxiinum of sixty hours per week or ten hours per day. Id.
24. Id at 64.
25. Id.
26. Id at 53.
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ute based upon a finding of unreasonableness concerning the use of
the state's police power.17 Justice Peckham's discussion of unrea-
sonableness suggests that the test he used was the rational rela-
tionship test.
Another case which illustrates the peak of economic protection is
Adkins v Children's Hospital.28 In Adkins, a statute authorizing a
state regulatory board to fix minimum wages for women and chil-
dren was declared unconstitutional. 2 The Court's opinion, written
by Justice Sutherland, stated that the regulation of wages violated
"the heart of the contract."3 0 Once again, the liberty of contract
was elevated to the status of something more than an ordinary
right, subject to restraint only upon the "existence of exceptional
circumstances."'3 Justice Sutherland wrote that the only way the
liberty of contract could be abridged was by a state exercising its
police power in a reasonable manner,3 2 but he never explained
what would constitute reasonable exercise.
Nebbia v New York 33 signalled the permanent change in the
Court's point of view about economic regulation and the state's po-
lice power. In Nebbia, New York sought to regulate the price
charged for milk. 4 This price regulation was found to be a valid
exercise of the police powers of the state relating to concern for the
health of the general public .3  The Court stated, "Price control,
like any other form of regulation, is unconstitutional only if arbi-
trary. . . and hence an unnecessary and unwarranted interference
with individual liberty. ' 36 Justice Roberts judged the constitution-
27. Id at 57. The Court seemed to describe the rational basis test for constitutional
review when they stated, "The act must have a more direct relation, as a means to an end,
and the end must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act can be held to be valid....
Id.
28. 261 US 525 (1923), overruled in West Coast Hotel Co. v Parrish, 300 US 379, 400
(1937).
29. Adkins, 261 US at 562.
30. Id at 553-54. At this point in history, the Court was slowly backing away from
due process protection of the absolute right to contract. After Lochner, 198 US 45 (1905),
the liberty to contract began losing its vitality, because legislation regulating working condi-
tions was upheld in Muller v Oregon, 208 US 412 (1908), and regulations concerning work-
ing hours were upheld in Bunting v Oregon, 243 US 426 (1917). However, in Adkins, Justice
Sutherland could not conceive of a more direct attack on the sanctity of contract than to
regulate the wages to be paid. Adkins, 261 US at 554.
31. Adkins, 261 US at 546.
32. Id.
33. 291 US 502 (1934).
34. Nebbia, 291 US at 515.




ality of the statute by a due process standard."7 He stated, "The
guarantee of due process. . . demands only that the law shall not
be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means se-
lected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object
sought to be attained.""8
The final nail in the coffin of economic due process was added by
the Court's decision in West Coast Hotel v Parrish.3 9 In West
Coast Hotel, the Court reviewed the validity of a statute which set
minimum wages for women working in the state of Washington.40
Chief Justice Hughes reasoned that the health and protection of
women were adequate state interests, and allowed the statute to
stand as a permissible exercise of police power.," He further held
that if the law has a reasonable relation to a proper legislative pur-
pose it should be upheld. 2 This is the rational relationship test in
full bloom. The Court specifically overruled the precedent set by
Adkins.4 3 So it seemed that even "the heart of the liberty of con-
tract ' 44 was capable of being regulated.
Due process was the preferred method of challenging economic
regulation during the early days of the Fourteenth Amendment,
but the modern method is to use equal protection. 5 The result of
this movement to equal protection is the forced recognition of its
dual tests: strict scrutiny 6 and rational basis. 7 The strict scrutiny
37. Id at 525.
38. Id.
39. 300 US 379 (1937).
40. West Coast Hotel, 300 US at 386.
41. Id at 398-99. Minimum wages were seen as necessary to provide the bare cost of
living, so women and children would not be a burden on the community. Id at 399.
42. Id at 398.
43. Id at 400. The Court stated: "Our conclusion is that the case of Adkins v Chil-
dren's Hospital, supra, should be, and it is, overruled." Id.
44. Adkins, 261 US at 554. These are the words used by Justice Sutherland in Ad-
kins. There, the Court apparently held that, although other aspects of the liberty to con-
tract could be regulated, the regulation of wages was so central to the right it could never be
regulated.
45. Michael J. Phillips, Another Look at Economic Substantive Due Process 1987
Wis L Rev 265, 287 (1987).
46. The definition of strict scrutiny is: a "test which requires a state to establish that
it has' compelling interest justifying the law and that distinctions created by law are neces-
sary to further some governmental purpose." Black's Law Dictionary 1422 (West, 6th ed
1990).
47. The definition of the rational basis test is where "an appellate court will not sec-
ond-guess the legislature as to the wisdom or rationality of a particular statute if there is a
rational basis for its enactment, and if the challenged law bears a reasonable relationship to
the attainment of some legitimate governmental objective." Id at 1262.
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standard is only used where a fundamental right 8 is abridged by a
regulation or where a suspect classification 49 is utilized.50 The ra-
tional relationship test is used in cases where the right being
abridged is not fundamental nor is there a suspect classification
being used. Economic rights seem to fit nicely into this category.
What is evident from this section of this comment is that the
amount of protection afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution changed over the years. Due pro-
cess went from a very limited application in the Slaughter House
Cases to the pinnacle of its power in Lochner. It seems the test for
protection of an individual's liberty interest was the rational rela-
tionship test with the Court concentrating on the state interests
portion of the test. The permanent decline in substantive due pro-
cess protection for economic rights began with Nebbia and was so-
lidified by West Coast Hotel. Therefore, the rational relationship
test was always the test used to judge the validity of economic reg-
ulatory statutes. However, the Court became more willing to match
up a rational reason with a newly accepted state interest.
The United States Supreme Court's willingness to accept a state
interest as legitimate has expanded to recognizing possible reasons
not even contemplated by the legislature. In McGowan v Mary-
land, 5 1 a Maryland statute that purported to outlaw retail sales of
commodities on Sundays was reviewed.52 The statute was reviewed
on two constitutional issues, equal protection and establishment of
religion.5
The equal protection challenge was based on some exceptions to
the Sunday ban for certain commodity sales or certain types of re-
tail stores.5 4 The Court held, "A statutory discrimination will not
be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
48. The definition of fundamental rights is "those rights which have their source, and
are explicitly or implicitly guaranteed, in the federal Constitution." Id at 674.
49. The definition of suspect classification is "classifications that are based upon a
trait which itself seems to contravene established constitutional principles so that any pur-
poseful use of the classification may be deemed 'suspect'. Examples include race, sex, na-
tional origin and alienage (with exceptions)." Id at 1446.
50. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 38 (1973).
51. 366 US 420 (1961).
52. McGowan, 366 US at 422.
53. Id at 445. As the religion clauses of the United States Constitution are beyond
the scope of this comment, no further analysis will be presented on this issue, except to note
that the Court found the statute to be valid in spite of the religion clauses. Id.
54. Id at 422, 423. Examples of the commodities exempted are fruits, gasoline, drugs
and newspapers. Id. Also, a store which did not employ more than one person other than the
owner could operate on Sunday. Id.
1992 Comments 375
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justify it. '"55 In this case the Court did not find that the reasonable
basis existed, but it went as far as to hold the statute was valid
because "the record is barren of any indication that this appar-
ently reasonable basis does not exist ... ,
Based on the previous discussion, I suggest that the test for pro-
tection of individual economic rights has never changed. It has al-
ways been the rational relationship test. This test has attached it-
self to the right involved. The trend is clear: in early cases the
Court was not willing to accept any state interest as sufficient to
uphold the statute which impaired a liberty interest. Today it
seems the Court will provide a state interest adequate to uphold a
statute if the legislature has not provided one. Thus, today it is
nearly impossible to have an economic regulation voided by using a
due process or equal protection argument in the federal courts.57
PENNSYLVANIA TREND IN PROTECTION FROM ECONoMIc REGULATION
The early precedent established by the Pennsylvania courts in
their handling of challenges to statutes which regulate individual
economic rights produce a picture very similar to the federal prece-
dent. When the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ruled on the is-
sue of due process rights or equal protection rights under the
Pennsylvania constitution in the area of economic regulation, it
has generally upheld statutes that involve economic regulation.
The cases presented in this section of this comment all rely on
equal protection arguments. Equal protection will be shown to be
the only area where protection of individual economic rights still
exists.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1975 decided Baltimore
and Ohio R.R. Co. v Department of Labor and Industry." In Bal-
timore and Ohio R.R., the legislature of Pennsylvania had passed a
law which required railroad workers to be paid on a weekly basis
unless covered by a collective bargaining agreement which had
other payment provisions.5" Employees of the railroad initiated an
administrative action in which the railroad was ordered to begin
55. Id at 426.
56. Id.
57. Strict scrutiny may come into play where equal protection is provided for, but
that situation is beyond the scope of this comment. See note 46 for the definition of strict
scrutiny.
58. 461 Pa 68, 334 A2d 636 (1975).
59. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 334 A2d at 638.
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paying its employees weekly in accordance with the statute.6 0 On
appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Justice Roberts de-
clared that federal equal protection and Article III, section 32 of
the Pennsylvania constitution are "not significantly different. '1
Justice Roberts adopted the rational relationship test because this
was not a situation that required the application of strict scru-
tiny.2 Using the rational basis test, the court upheld the validity
of the statute by finding that the state's purpose of protecting the
employees of the financially unstable railroads was a legitimate
state interest. The statute was a reasonable means which was ra-
tionally related to that interest.
6 3
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld a statute, which
barred tort actions against contractors for deficiencies in their
work if the actions were not brought within twelve years after the
completion of the work, in Freezer Storage, Inc. v Armstrong Cork
Co."' The action was based on the plaintiff's attempt to sue the
contractor who negligently installed a ceiling in its building more
than twelve years prior to its bringing of the suit.65 The plaintiff
argued that the statute violated Article III, Section 32 of the Penn-
sylvania constitution because it was a special law, which denied
him the equal protection of the laws.6 Once again Justice Roberts
found that the statute was a valid exercise of the state's police
powers because it was "manifestly rational. 6 7 Since the state was
exercising its police powers, the statute was valid as it was only
required to be rationally related to any state interest.6 8
The preceding two cases illustrate the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's use of the federal standard of rational basis in an equal
protection challenge. In both cases, a statute which had economic
ramifications was held to be valid based on the statute's rational
relationship to a legitimate state interest. This is entirely consis-
tent with the modern federal line of analysis.
60. Id.
61. Id at 643.
62. Id. The strict scrutiny test only applies where there is a suspect class or a funda-
mental right being abridged. Id at 643 n 11.
63. Id at 644.
64. 476 Pa 270, 382 A2d 715 (1978).
65. Freezer Storage, 382 A2d at 717.
66. Id at 718. A special law is a law which is not a general law; that is, it is legislation
to benefit a specific class, to the detriment of all others. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. Justice Roberts held it was rational for a state to adjust time periods accord-
ing to the scope of the liability involved. Id.
1992
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Even though the Pennsylvania courts used the federal rational
basis test and seemed to follow the federal trend of tolerating stat-
utory economic regulation, there is precedent for the protection of
economic rights in Pennsylvania. One early case that goes against
the federal thinking is Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc. v Siggins.6 e
In Hertz, a Pennsylvania statute that regulated the car rental busi-
ness was challenged. 70 The portion of the act which was challenged
was the requirement that any person who wanted to operate a car
rental business, which rented automobiles without drivers, had to
obtain a certificate of need from the Public Utility Commission.7
The plaintiff, Hertz, sued in equity to enjoin the state Attorney
General from enforcing the statute. 72 At the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court level, Justice Jones identified the state interest in-
volved as regulation of the use of the highways.73 He then stated
that the statute was not reasonably related to that state interest.
74
The final holding was that the statute was a special law in viola-
tion of the Pennsylvania Constitution.75
What is particularly interesting in the Hertz case is that the
statute under review had a statement of purpose in its preamble.76
The court held that the "recitals of fact in the preamble of the Act
are not conclusive of the asserted public interest."7 7 This was bold
on the part of the Pennsylvania court, because the federal trend, as
is seen in McGowan, is to accept the recital of a purpose as suffi-
cient reason to uphold any economic legislation.
During the 1970's, a new test developed in Pennsylvania for
equal protection analysis: the fair and substantial relationship test.
The fair and substantial relationship test will uphold a statute
where a classification rests on "some ground of difference which
has a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation,
so that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike."'78
The fair and substantial relationship test has its roots in Moyer
69. 359 Pa 25, 58 A2d 464 (1948).
70. Hertz, 58 A2d at 467.
71. Id at 469.
72. Id at 467.
73. Id at 476.
74. Id.
75. Id. At this point in the history of Pennsylvania, the Equal Protection Clause of
the Pennsylvania constitution was found at Article III, section 7. Id.
76. Id at 468. According to the statute's preamble, the purpose of the statute was "to
provide a proper and safe highway transportation system in the public interest. . . ." Id.
77. Id at 473. The court continued by stating that the ultimate decision as to the
propriety of the use of police power rests with the courts. Id.
78. Moyer v Phillips, 462 Pa 395, 341 A2d 441, 443 (1975).
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v Phillips7 9 and In Re Estate of Cavill. Both Cavill and Moyer
involved challenges to state statutes which were, in effect, restrict-
ing an individual's economic freedom. Cavill was a case where a
statute restricted the right of a decedent to leave his estate to a
charity if the bequest was madb within thirty days of his death.8
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to give any import to
the statute and instead distributed the estate to the named chari-
ties.2 Justice Roberts held that since there was a lack of a fair and
substantial relationship between the statute and the state's inter-
est of protecting the heirs of a decedent from unscrupulous chari-
ties, the statute was violative of equal protection.8 3 Moyer was a
libel case where there was a challenge to a Pennsylvania statute
which dismissed libel actions upon the death of the defendant
while preserving other causes of action. 4 Moyer was libeled by his
physician and proceeded to file suit against him. 5 At the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court level, Chief Justice Jones held that the stat-
ute did not meet the fair and substantial relationship test and
could not stand. 6 The above cases show that the Pennsylvania
courts will at times void a statute as being too restrictive of indi-
vidual economic rights. Thus it seems that the Pennsylvania sub-
stantial relationship test is more restrictive than the federal ra-
tional relationship test.
In 1978 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided another case
protecting economic rights, Kroger v O'Hara Township.8 7 In this
case, Kroger was cited for violation of the Pennsylvania Sunday
Trading Laws.8 8 Kroger challenged the constitutionality of the
statute based on an equal protection argument.8 9 The Pennsylva-
nia statute had been amended many times after its initial enact-
ment, creating many exceptions to the statute.90 Justice Manderino
struck down the statute as violative of the Equal Protection Clause
79. 462 Pa 395, 341 A2d 441 (1975).
80. 459 Pa 411, 329 A2d 503 (1974).
81. CavilU, 329 A2d at 504.
82. Id at 506.
83. Id.
84. Moyer, 341 A2d at 442.
85. Id.
86. Id at 445.
87. 481 Pa 101, 392 A2d 266 (1978).
88. Kroger, 392 A2d at 267.
89. Id at 273.
90. Id at 272. Specific exceptions to the coverage of the sales ban included, among
others, sales of newspapers, sporting events could be held, and small family-owned estab-
lishments could sell food. Id.
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of the Pennsylvania Constitution" The court's specific reasoning
was that this statute was a regulation of trade, and trade was an
enumerated right under the Pennsylvania Equal Protection
Clause.92 The court reasoned that since trade was an enumerated
right in the state constitution, it deserved a heightened level of
protection. 93 The court decided to use the fair and substantial rela-
tionship test for its analysis.94
Another important case dealing with an equal protection chal-
lenge to an economic regulation arose at the court of common pleas
level in Pennsylvania. In Kownacki's Serv. Center v Pittsburgh,95
Judge Zappala, later Justice Zappala of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, voided a Pittsburgh city ordinance banning self service gas-
oline stations within the city.96 Kownacki, the owner of a gasoline
station within the city limits, challenged the constitutionality of
the statute under the theory that it violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Pennsylvania constitution. 97 The city defended the
ordinance by arguing that it was a proper exercise of its police
powers for the purpose of protecting the public health and wel-
fare.98 Citing the Hertz DrivUrself Stations Inc. v Siggins case,
Judge Zappala stated that it was the court's responsibility to ques-
tion the state's power to pass such regulations.99 Judge Zappala
recognized Article III, section 32 of the Pennsylvania constitution
as the Equal Protection Clause of the Pennsylvania constitution
and included it in the court's review. 100 Judge Zappala thus identi-
fied equal protection as the right being asserted.1 1 However, he
did not make clear which constitution he applied, referring to both
the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions in his analy-
sis. 102 His analysis mentioned both the strict scrutiny and the ra-
91. Id at 273. Justice Manderino wrote, "When a law which prohibits business activ-
ity is riddled with exception after exception, a time comes when the general scheme is so
diluted that it violates the equal protection of the laws. That time is today." Id.
92. Id at 274.
93. Id.
94. Id at 275.
95. 29 Pa D & C 3d 1 (1982), aft'd, 81 Pa Commw 608, 474 A2d 403 (1984).
96. Kownacki's Serv. Center, 29 Pa D & C 3d at 2.
97. Id at 9.
98. Id at 5, 9. The city did not attempt to prove the purpose of the statute or the
purported state interest as it assumed the court would apply the federal standard of review,
and such a showing would not be needed. See id at 11-13.
99. Id at 8.





tional relationship tests, but he was satisfied that the statute could
not even meet the looser rational relationship test.10 3 The ultimate
holding in Kownacki was to invalidate the statute based on its vio-
lation of equal protection.104 Judge Zappala was clearly looking for
a legitimate state interest to which the statute could be reasonably
related.0 5 He specifically rejected the city's argument that the
statute was designed to protect the health and safety of the citi-
zens, because experts at trial showed that safety hazards were not
a legitimate concern.106 Kownacki was affirmed by the common-
wealth court, which adopted the opinion of Judge Zappala as their
own. 107
This case is an example of a situation where a state court ana-
lyzed the constitutionality of a statute but did not mention which
constitution was the basis of its decision. It is also important that
Judge Zappala declared he was using the rational relationship test
but narrowly construed what a legitimate state interest was. These
actions are in direct conflict with the analysis used by the federal
courts.
The most current case in this Pennsylvania series is Ridley
Arms, Inc. v Township of Ridley. 0° This case had facts identical
to the hypothetical situation outlined in the introduction to this
comment. The business was Ridley Arms, Inc., a 241 unit apart-
ment complex in Ridley Township, Delaware County, Pennsylva-
nia.109 The township's method of collecting the trash collection fee
was to include the fee as part of the township's real estate tax
bill. 1 0 For reasons of sanitation and avoidance of possible tort lia-
bility, the owners of the apartment complex decided not to use the
township collection and instead privately contracted for the ser-
vice.' Other commercial businesses in Ridley Township were able
to opt out of the mandatory trash collection." 2
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Ridley claimed to be using
103. Id at 10-11.
104. Id at 11.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Pittsburgh v Kownacki's Serv. Center, Inc., 81 Pa Commw 608, 474 A2d 403
(1984).
108. 515 Pa 542, 531 A2d 414 (1987).
109. Ridley Arms, 531 A2d at 414.
110. Id at 416.
111. Id.
112. Id at 415. The township ordinance specifically included apartment dwellings but
excluded other high volume locations such as shopping centers and supermarkets. Id.
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the federal standard of review for non-fundamental rights, the ra-
tional basis test.113 Justice Flaherty concluded that the Ridley
Township ordinance was unreasonable and had to be struck
down.1 4 The actual holding of this case was that the statute was
found incompatible with the unreasonableness test of the First
Class Township Code; but what makes this case pertinent is that it
was analyzed under equal protection review.1
5
The point of interest is that the Pennsylvania court overturned
an economic regulation. This court applied the federal rational ba-
sis test and yet the statute was held void. In the federal system,
when a statute is undergoing rational basis analysis for constitu-
tionality, it is indeed rare for a statute to be struck down, as the
court will look for any relation of a regulation to any legitimate
state interest in order to uphold the statute."' The rational basis
test only looks for a reasonable relationship between the operation
of the statute and its purported purpose.1 7 The federal review of
the rational basis will find the reasonableness in the statute's
statement of purpose or even have the court supply the reason af-
ter the fact."" The heightened review of strict scrutiny is only used
in the federal courts where a fundamental right is involved or a
suspect classification is used.1 9 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
used a rational basis test in Ridley Arms, and the statute passed
constitutional review but was not reasonable under the First Class
Township Code.'20 However, the fact that the court invalidated the
ordinance shows that, at the very least, Pennsylvania's courts are
more open for the review of economic regulations.
113. Id. The rational basis test is described as being in two parts: first, the legislation
must have a legitimate state purpose based on the state's police powers, and second, the act
must bear a rational relationship to the end it seeks to further. Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v City
of Mesquite, 630 F2d 1029, 1039 (5th Cir 1980).
114. Ridley Arms, 531 A2d at 418. The court stated, "If a government cannot provide
services at a cost commensurate with similar services provided by private enterprise, it is, by
definition, unreasonable. . . ." Id.
115. Id. The court seemed to use the rational basis test for the equal protection analy-
sis, but used a reasonableness standard to strike down the statute. Id.
116. See the discussion of McGowan v Maryland, 366 US 420 (1961), at notes 51-56
and accompanying text.
117. See note 10 for the definition of rational -basis.
118. Phillips, 1987 Wis L Rev at 284 (cited in note 45).
119. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 8 (1973).
120. Perhaps the reason the court chose to invalidate the statute under the First Class





The level of protection afforded an individual's economic rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion has changed over the years. The Equal Protection Clause ex-
panded the Fourteenth Amendment protection to all people. The
protection of due process led the way for substantive protection
through the early years following the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has always used a
rational relationship test for determining the validity of an eco-
nomic regulation. Thus a statute should be upheld if its purpose is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Although the test
has remained the same, the determination of what a statute's pur-
pose is and whether or not it is a reasonable way of achieving the
state's interest has changed. It seems that due process was used to
overturn state statutes that interfered with an individual's liberty
of contract. Under the rational relationship test, these statutes
failed because there was no state interest that the United States
Supreme Court would recognize as legitimate. The strength of the
Due Process Clause was diminished when the United States Su-
preme Court began to accept certain state interests, such as regula-
tion of labor and employment, as legitimate. The current method
of review using rational basis falls under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A statute which regulates
economic matters will be upheld if the court can identify the exis-
tence of any possible state interest. States will tend to declare the
purpose of a statute in a preamble to the statute in order to pre-
sent a state interest to ensure validity. Thus, I suggest that the
summary of the federal status quo is that an economic regulatory
statute will be upheld as a valid exercise of state police powers
against due process or equal protection challenges if the statute
declares a purpose and state interest. It seems very unlikely that
any statute regulating economic liberties could be found violative
of the United States Constitution.
The Pennsylvania courts have generally followed the federal
analysis. However, it seems that in many instances, the courts have
analyzed a statute for constitutional infirmity, have upheld the
statute and then never identified their method of judgment. The
opinions do not state whether the court has adopted the federal
analysis or if there is an independent state analysis which coinci-
dentally arrives at the same outcome as the federal method. How-
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ever, some independent state analysis seems to exist. 2 ' Some con-
stitutional challenges against economic regulatory statutes have
been successful in Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania claims to use the
rational relationship test but at times the courts have used a fair
and substantial relationship test to analyze a constitutional chal-
lenge. This fair and substantial relationship standard is ordinarily
used where a specifically enumerated right from the Pennsylvania
constitution is being abridged. This fair and substantial relation-
ship test seems to be more narrow than rational relationship,
which may cause some statutes to be voided in Pennsylvania
courts, when they would have been upheld in federal courts. The
fair and substantial relationship test is construed somewhere be-
tween the rational relationship test and strict scrutiny.
What should a lawyer do if he or she has a client whose case
requires a state economic regulatory statute to be held unconstitu-
tional? The lawyer should go to state court and argue the case as
an equal protection case under the Pennsylvania Constitution. The
lawyer should attempt to have the state judge decide the case on
independent state analysis. He should argue that regulation of eco-
nomic rights is a restriction on trade and the heightened standard
of fair and substantial relationship should apply. If the lawyer can
accomplish this, he will at least have his day in court to argue the
merits and perhaps win his case.
However, all this assumes that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
is ready to create its own precedent. The Pennsylvania courts
should clearly identify the applicable constitutional protection
they are reviewing. The court should also clearly identify what the
test for analysis of individual economic rights is in Pennsylvania.
Currently it seems Pennsylvania uses both the rational relation-
ship test and the fair and substantial relationship test to analyze
individual economic rights. I feel it is good that Pennsylvania has
developed a more strict fair and substantial relationship test for
constitutional analysis, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
not been consistent in its application, nor has the court given any
guidelines as to when its application is required.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court needs to assert itself and de-
cide where it stands on economic rights. Consistency in the law is
121. Justice Brennan in his 1977 Harvard Law Review article suggests that state
courts develop their own rules and principles for affording constitutional protection accord-
ing to their own constitutions. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protec-
tion of Individual Rights, 90 Harv L Rev 489, 302 (1977).
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one of the most basic requirements of good government. Pennsyl-
vania does not have this, at least not yet.
John E. Gomolchak

